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特朗普政府2025年版《美国国家安全战略》及其对委内瑞拉的军事入侵,是美国“新门罗主义”政策转向的显著体现,既展示出美国西半球战略的调整方向,也反映出美国在国家利益观、角色观和国际秩序认知层面的根本性变化,更加改变了冷战结束以来美拉关系的基本形态。从国家利益视角来看,2025年版《美国国家安全战略》以及特朗普第二任期对拉美政策实践,反映出现阶段美国将在拉美地区的利益界定为构建绝对安全的“西半球堡垒”、重构拉美对美国的单向经济依赖、主导拉美政治生态三个层次,展现出强化“主导—依附”的等级秩序,体现出“美国利益至上”的排他性利益观。在此局面下,美拉深层次利益冲突进一步凸显,具体体现在安全叙事认知分歧、“垄断控制—自主发展”目标对抗、“政治干涉—主权捍卫”价值观对立三个维度。在美国强干涉主义政策影响下,为捍卫国家主权,维护安全、经济、政治利益,拉美国家需从多个维度探索有效的战略应对。一方面在美国安全关切的核心领域,通过适当方式降低美国的直接军事干涉风险;另一方面则通过地区一体化模式创新、国际合作多元布局、国际多边机制强化等形成对美国的约束,以争取更大的战略自主空间。
Abstract：The Trump administration' s 2025 National Security Strategyand its military intervention in Venezuela are striking manifestations of thes hift toward a “ Neo-Monroism ” policy. These developments revealadjustments to U. S. strategy in the Western Hemisphere and reflectf undamental changes in the US' perceptions of national interests, role,and international order. These changes alter the fundamental nature ofU. S.-Latin American relations since the end of the Cold War. From anational interest perspective, the 2025 National Security Strategy and theT rump administration' s Latin American policies during its second termsuggest that the U. S. currently defines its regional interests across threel evels: establishing a “ Fortress of Western Hemisphere ” of absolutesecurity, restructuring Latin America's economic dependence on theU. S., and dominating the political landscape. These goals reflect areinforced, hierarchical “hegemony-dependence” order and an exclusive“ America First ” perspective on national interests. Under thesecircumstances, deep-seated conflicts of interest between the U. S. andL atin America have become increasingly apparent. These conflicts manifestin three dimensions: divergent security narratives, the clash between“monopolistic control” and “ autonomous development” goals, and theideological opposition between “ political interference” and “ sovereigntyd efense. ” Due to U. S. interventionist policies, Latin American nationsmust develop effective strategic responses to defend their nationals overeignty and security, economic interests, and political interests. Onthe one hand, they should reduce the risk of direct U. S. militaryi ntervention in areas central to U. S. security concerns through appropriatecompromises. On the other hand, they should innovate regional integrationm odels, diversify international cooperation frameworks, and strengtheninternational multilateral mechanisms to secure greater strategic autonomya nd constrain U. S. actions.
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基本信息:
中图分类号:D871.2;D873
引用信息:
[1]周志伟.“新门罗主义”转向下的美拉利益冲突及拉美战略选择[J].拉丁美洲研究,2026,48(03):2-23+146.
基金信息:
国家社会科学基金重点项目“美国对拉美的战略调整影响及中国应对研究”(编号:24AGJ013); 中国社会科学院智库基础研究项目“特朗普新任期美拉关系新动向及中国应对”(编号:ZKJC252302)的阶段性成果
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