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制度属性、实力对比和地缘关系共同塑造国际制度变革的动因、路径和挑战。在百年变局加速演进的背景下，安理会改革涉及权力再分配与制度适应性调整，这不仅关乎联合国的合法性与有效性，也成为国际制度变革的焦点议题。在联合国成立八十周年之际，巴西作为典型区域性大国、发展中大国和新兴市场国家，呼吁安理会改革的诉求日益强烈。在制度变革的分析框架下，巴西推动安理会改革并谋求“入常”的动因主要包括：“全球南方”崛起带来时代机遇，追求区域领导地位和提升国际地位，卢拉总统的大国抱负与外交实践。因此，巴西提出的改革方案主要包括改革安理会组成、改革否决权机制、改进工作方法等。为实现其目标，巴西主要采取三种路径：一是通过推行多边外交破除制度改革门槛，二是通过加大国际公共产品供给树立大国形象，三是通过协调区域关系减少变革阻力。由于受制度变革门槛较高、综合实力不足、地缘关系复杂等因素制约，巴西的“入常”前景仍充满不确定性。但从国际制度演进的逻辑来看，随着“全球南方”国家综合实力的持续提升及其在国际议程中能动性的不断增强，既有制度安排与现实权力分布之间的不匹配将愈加突出，未来包括巴西在内的“全球南方”国家仍将以积极的姿态推动构建更加公正、合理的全球治理体系。
Abstract：Institutional attributes, power dynamics and geopolitical relations collectively shape the drivers, pathways and challenges of international institutional transformation. Against the backdrop of accelerating global changes, Security Council reform involves power redistribution and adaptive institutional adjustments. This concerns not only the legitimacy and effectiveness of the United Nations,but has also become a focal issue in international institutional transformation. To mark the UN's 80th anniversary, Brazil, as a regional power, a major developing country and an emerging market economy, has increasingly advocated for Security Council reform. Within the analytical framework of institutional transformation, Brazil 's motivations for promoting Security Council reform and seeking permanent membership can be summarised as follows: opportunities arising from the rise of the Global South; the pursuit of regional leadership and enhanced international standing; and President Lula's great power ambitions and diplomatic practices.Accordingly,Brazil's proposed reform agenda encompasses restructuring the Security Council's composition, reforming the veto mechanism and improving working methods, among other measures. To achieve these objectives, Brazil is pursuing three main strategies: advancing multilateral diplomacy to dismantle institutional barriers, increasing the supply of international public goods to project an image of a major power,and coordinating regional relations to reduce resistance to change.However,Brazil's prospects for permanent membership of UN Security Council remain uncertain due to constraints such as high institutional reform thresholds,insufficient national strength and complex geopolitical relationships. From the perspective of international institutional evolution,however,as the comprehensive strength of the “Global South ” nations continues to grow and their influence on the international agenda increases,the discrepancy between existing institutional arrangements and the actual distribution of power will become more apparent. In future,Brazil and other “Global South”nations will continue to actively promote the construction of a fairer global governance system.
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(2)本文中“国际制度”的概念既包括国际组织内部章程和规则的调整,也涵盖以国际组织为核心的国际秩序观念和运行逻辑的变化。基于此,本文将国际组织改革视为观察和剖析国际制度变革的重要载体。
(3)国家中心主义和国际组织中心主义分别强调主权国家和国际官僚机构是国际组织变革的主要施动者。相关研究参见余博闻:《国际组织变革理论的演进与启示》,载《国际政治研究》,2021年第3期,第38-60页;杨双梅:《霸权国推动国际组织改革的策略差异》,载《太平洋学报》,2025年第4期,第34-36页。
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基本信息:
中图分类号:D813.2;D877.7
引用信息:
[1]王越,袁正清.国际制度变革与巴西的联合国安理会改革[J].拉丁美洲研究,2025,47(06):2-24+157-158.
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